The massive integration of renewable energy sources in the power grid ecosystem with the aim of reducing carbon emissions must cope with their intrinsically intermittent and unpredictable nature. Therefore, the grid must improve its capability of controlling the energy demand by adapting the power consumption curve to match the trend of green energy generation. This could be done by scheduling the activities of deferrable and/or interruptible electrical appliances.
Introduction
One of the most relevant goals in the design of the future energy grid is the massive introduction of power plants exploiting Renewable Energy Sources (RES, e.g. wind, solar and geothermal energy) to reduce carbon emission and shift towards a more sustainable power usage. However, due to the intrinsic 5 unpredictability in the production of "green" power caused by the intermittent nature of renewables, the new Smart Grid scenario will cope with numerous issues related to the balancing of energy generation and consumption within the grid, in order to satisfy the energy demand while avoiding power waste. In addition, the energy market will experience more uncertain conditions, which 10 could possibly affect the dynamics of energy pricing [1] .
In order to increase the flexibility of the energy utilization, three complementary approaches have been proposed. The first is to equip the grid with high capacity storage banks, capable of storing energy surpluses and to release them in case of energy production deficits [2] . However, today's state-of-the-art tech- 15 nology is still immature to allow a widespread introduction of storage plants, which would require tremendous installation and maintenance costs. A second possibility is to induce some modifications in the user's energy utilization behavior by designing time-variable tariffs or introducing incentives to shift the use of some appliances to off-peak hours [3] . Unfortunately, this approach does not 20 provide any form of direct control on the load conditions of the grid. Finally, the third alternative relies on load scheduling approaches operating at single household level or at neighborhood/microgrid level with the aim of shaping the energy demand profile in order to meet the production trend. Such mechanisms work according to the following principle: delay-tolerant and/or interruptible 25 operations can be scheduled and initiated only when the green energy production conditions are favorable, while in case of power shortage the starting time can be postponed or the service can be momentarily interrupted. Moreover, a wide category of appliances (e.g. refrigerators, air conditioning, cooling/heating systems) can tune (up to a certain extent) their power consumption according 30 to the grid state.
The drawback of the load scheduling approach is that it requires the users to communicate to the scheduler their preferences about the time of use and the energy consumption profile of the appliances to be scheduled, which makes the system prone to appliance load monitoring attacks (e.g. Non Intrusive Load
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Monitoring (NILM), load disaggregation algorithms, and transient analysis). In fact, it has been widely proved that, by analyzing the power consumption trend of an individual household, very detailed information about the personal habits of the occupants can be inferred [4, 5] , making it possible even to identify the specific electrical appliances working in a given time period. Therefore, 40 designing a load scheduling system capable of preserving the privacy of the users is still an open issue.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-friendly infrastructure to perform appliance load scheduling within a neighborhood, which directly exposes neither the time of use and the energy consumption pattern of the single appliances, nor 45 the identity of the users specifying the scheduling requests. Our solution relies on a set of schedulers which collaboratively perform the load planning by means of a MultiParty Computation (MPC) protocol based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. The proposed architecture is in line with the recent proposals by regulation bodies: for example, the California Public Utilities Commission [6] fosters 50 the realization of Energy Data Centers aimed at the collection and elaboration of energy consumption data and run by governmental or public entities. While such Data Centers are assumed to be honest, our proposed architecture ensures no violation of the customers' privacy even in presence of collectors behaving according to the "honest but curious" model.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview of the related literature, while Section 3 recalls some background notions. Section 4 describes the privacy-preserving scheduling architecture. The attacker model and the security analysis of our proposed infrastructure are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, the scheduling problem is formulated as an 60 Integer Linear Program (ILP), which is used as a benchmark for the complexity and performance assessment provided in Section 7. Conclusions are drawn in the final Section.
Related Work
Various models for energy load management systems have been recently proposed by the research community: in [7] , an optimal and automatic residential energy consumption scheduling framework is described, which attempts to strike a balance between minimizing the electricity payment and minimizing the waiting time for the operation of each appliance in the household, in presence of time-variable tariffs. The problem is modelled by means of a linear 70 programming formulation and a weighted average price prediction filter is used to estimate the future trend of the energy tariff. A real-time residential load management model and algorithm is also discussed in [8] , which differentiates the scheduling policy according to the type of electrical appliances to be served (interruptible, non interruptible and must-run). However, in both cases the 75 system is designed for a single household, while our scheduling framework is aimed at controlling multiple residential buildings. The authors of [9] propose a neighborhood scheduler that divides the energy requests in queues according to their shape and priority and optimizes the service time of deferrable individual appliances (e.g. washing machines, dishwashers, cloth dryers, and electric vehi-80 cles recharge). In case the electrical appliances are assumed to have rectangular energy consumption profile, the scheduling problem can be treated as a rectangle/strip packing problem, which has been thoroughly investigated, for example in [10, 11, 12] , and consists in optimally placing a set of rectangles of different dimensions in a two-dimensional space of given width and infinite height.
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In our framework, differently from [7] , the optimization goal is to shape the cumulative energy consumption of a set of appliances according to the availability of energy generated by renewable energy sources. We deal with the same scenario and appliance category of [9] , but with respect to [9] we also consider must-run and interruptible appliances. Conversely, [12] proposes an online 90 power strip packing algorithm for malleable energy demands with rectangular shape, providing performance guarantees in terms of upper bounds with respect to the optimal solution. Apart from the different appliance category, though our solution does not provide any guarantee on the quality of service experienced by the users, it deals with appliances having a generic energy consumption curve.
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Though the problem of securely managing the energy consumption data has been widely studied in the context of the Automatic Metering Infrastructure (AMI) of Smart Grid, to the best of our knowledge this is the one of the first studies specifically dealing with data security in a load scheduling framework.
Moreover, the security assumptions modeling the adversarial entities which at- proposed system hides the users' individual information to any external entity (e.g., energy provider or grid manager) but requires the customers to communicate their power schedules to their neighbours. Conversely, paper [14] avoids data exchange among households, but assumes a trusted energy utility to collect the individual power consumption curves and to broadcast price information 110 which are updated at every game iteration. Our solution does not require any end-to-end communication among the households: neighboring meters acts exclusively as relays running the Crowds protocol to transmit messages which are ciphered by means of an hybrid encryption algorithm. Furthermore, our framework assumes a pool of possibly colluding honest-but-curious schedulers,
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ensuring that no information leaks occurs in case at least one scheduler is not colluded. Papers [15, 16] assume that exchanging aggregated power consumption data at household level (e.g., on hourly basis) is sufficient to hide the usage patterns of single electric appliances to untrustworthy neighbours. However, several studies on Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (see, e.g., [17, 18] ) prove that 120 the power consumption patterns of individual appliances can easily be inferred from house-aggregated measurements. To defy such kind of attacks, our proposed protocol hides the energy consumption patterns of individual appliances to both schedulers and neighboring meters by means of Shamir Secret Sharing scheme: the only information disclosed to the schedulers is the appliance 125 category (must-run, deferrable, interruptible) and the feasible starting times.
Among the techniques proposed to securely collect meter readings, paper [19] describes a wavelet-based data perturbation method to allow multiple entities to access the data generated by a meter with different levels of detail, according to their needs and access rights. Alternative techniques rely on data perturbation
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[20, 21, 22] , pseudonymization [23, 24, 25] , or on data aggregation by means of MultiParty Computation [26, 27, 28] . Our proposed privacy-preserving scheduling infrastructure is inspired by the one originally presented in [29] and adapted to the Smart Grid context in [28] , and is based on the same homomorphic encryption scheme, named Shamir Secret Sharing. However, with respect to [28] , 135 which deals with the secure collection of meter readings in AMI, in this paper we cope with an inherently different problem, characterized by peculiar privacy requirements that must be addressed by means of specifically designed security solutions. 
Background

Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [30] belongs to the family of cryptographic threshold schemes, which are designed to allow the collaborative reconstruction of a secret. In a (w, t)-threshold scheme, the secret is divided in w parts called shares, which are distributed among the protocol participants and 145 can be reconstructed if at least t ≤ w participants cooperate.
The SSS scheme works as follows: let m ∈ Z q be the secret, where q is a prime number, greater than w and than all the possible secrets. (see e.g. [32, 33] ). In the remainder of the paper, we will adopt the procedure first introduced in [34] and described in [33] , which works as follows: each party holding the s-th shares (x s , y s ), (x s , y s ) of the secrets m and m to be compared indicates that m ≤ m . The reader is referred to [33] for additional details about the collaborative procedure and the proof of the correctness of the comparison protocol.
1 Note that in a modulo n field negative numbers are represented by the upper half of the range [0, n − 1].
Anonymous Routing with Crowds
Crowds is an anonymous routing protocol originally proposed in [35] to hide the true sender of a message by routing it randomly within a large group of users (the crowd ). The protocol assumes the presence of a central node called blender, which is responsible of providing each node with the list of active crowd members and of updating it periodically, and that the communications between any two members of the crowd are encrypted using a symmetric key encryption scheme.
Upon receipt of a message, each crowd member P behaves as follows: with probability p > 0.5, it forwards the message to a randomly chosen node within the crowd (possibly itself), otherwise it sends the node to the final addressee (see Algorithm 1). The most important anonymization property of Crowds is that the entity to which the messages are sent is equally likely to receive the message from any crowd member independently of the original sender, i.e.
whereG is the random variable indicating the last hop of the message and G is the random variable indicating the original source of the message. For a proof of this statement and a detailed security analysis of the protocol, the reader is referred to [35] .
It is worth noting that our privacy-preservation protocol can be built upon 180 other anonymous routing protocols, provided that they guarantee security properties similar to (1) . We think Crowds is particularly well suited for the Neighborhood Area Networks of Smart Grids, which may comprise only a limited number of nodes, because its security properties do not depend on the size of the network. 
The Privacy-Friendly Load Scheduling Framework
As depicted in Fig. 1 , our proposed architecture comprises a set of Appliances, A, each one generating its own load scheduling requests, and a set of Schedulers, S, which collaboratively define the starting delay of the service requests received from the Appliances. Note that, as in [9] , we consider deferrable Appliances without providing any guarantee on the maximum delay imposed by the scheduling algorithm on their starting times. However, with respect to [9] we also include must-run and interruptible Appliances in our analysis: service requests generated by must-run devices must be served upon arrival without delays nor interruptions, while interruptible appliances tolerate not only an initial 195 service delay but also intermediate interruptions.
The architecture also includes a Smart Gateway in each household, which is equipped with secure communication capabilities (e.g. as the one proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security in [36] ) and is responsible of gathering the service requests generated by the Appliances inside the building
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and to convey them to the Schedulers. In the following we will indicate as G the set of Gateways. We also assume that:
1. The parties agree on a hybrid encryption algorithm E(K e , ·) and a corre- Once all the Schedulers have received their shares, they verify the feasibility 225 of each delayed curve by checking whether the total power load of the Appliances already scheduled does not exceed the expected amount of energy generated by the RESes. We assume that such expected supply curve T (i) (i ≤ 1 ≤T ) is public and known to all the Schedulers. Such procedure is performed by means of a collaborative protocol based on the one proposed in [33] , which 230 enables the Schedulers to make comparisons by operating directly on the shares. • if a is a must-run Appliance, g computes a sequence V (i) a of lengthT , where:
otherwise which corresponds to setting the Appliance starting time Γ a to the following time slot (i.e. Γ a = τ + 1), without any intermediate interruption
s ), where x s is the ID of Scheduler s. Note that the random coefficients ρ 1 , ρ 2 , · · · , ρ t−1 used by the SSS scheme are refreshed for each sample.
Then, g generates an ephemeral encryption/decryption keypair (K g e , K g d ) for the hybrid encryption scheme, a nonce r a , which is used as a tag associated to the service request generated by the ath Appliance, and sends the message:
to the sth Scheduler 2 by means of the anonymous routing protocol Crowds 250 with forwarding probability p.
• if a is a deferrable Appliance, g computesT − τ sequences
of lengthT , where: 
where P j indicates a random permutation of the sequences S • if a is a deferrable and interruptible Appliance, g computes (
The expected daily energy production by RESes is expressed by the sequence 
and broadcasts it to every Gateway g ∈ G (note that broadcasting the message is necessary, since the identity of the sender of the load request is unknown to the Schedulers due to the usage of the Crowds protocol).
Upon reception of the w messages O s (one from each of the w Schedulers), each Gateway compares the tags associated to the requests generated by the local Appliances to r a . In case of matching, for every sample i of each sequence j, it recovers c i,j by means of the w collected shares S i,j s (c) and computes the final comparison result ξ i,j according to [33] . Then, for each sequence j, g calculates Ξ j = ξ 1,j ∧ . . . ∧ ξT ,j . Finally, g schedules Γ a = τ + 1 + j, where j = min {j : Ξ j =1} j, communicates the pair Γ a , B a to a, and anonymously sends to each Scheduler the shares of the jth sequence by means of the Crowds protocol:
In turn, each Scheduler s replaces P s (i) with P s (i) + y a,i,j s
(1 ≤ i ≤T ). In 
The Gateway locally connected to the Appliance a obtains the final com- For the sake of easiness, we do not discuss the case of multiple requests arriving in a short time interval: we assume that the Schedulers are able to process multiple requests without ambiguities. 
Attacker Model and Security Analysis
Attacker Model
We assume a scenario where both Gateways and Schedulers behave according to the honest-but-curious attacker model: they obey to the protocol rules but try to infer the identities of the owners of active electrical appliances and the type of appliance being used. The first objective can be achieved by asso-
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ciating the service requests to the identifier of the Gateway initiating them e.g. through a linking attack, while the second implies the application of appliance load monitoring techniques. Conversely, we assume that the time of use of the appliances does not represent, by itself, a sensitive information, as long as it cannot be linked to the owner nor to the type of the electrical appliance. However,
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it is worth noting that the probability of success of such kind of linking attacks, which fall into the field of traffic analysis, decreases when the number of protocol participants increase, and can therefore be lowered by properly setting the size of the set A. A possible countermeasure to linking attacks is to introduce random scheduling delays for each appliance to be scheduled. Unfortunately, 300 such approach would lead to a strong degradation of the protocol performance in terms of the average delay experienced by the users, which would be intolerable in real scenarios. Moreover, the discussion of the impact of timing attacks on both the Crowds routing and scheduling protocol is out of the scope of this paper.
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Though in this paper we do not discuss the case of dishonest users, it is worth noting that the protocol discourages selfish users from declaring their appliances to be must-run, regardless to their real type, in order to eliminate their experienced scheduling delay: since the protocol aims at adapting the overall power load to the energy production by RESes, a large fraction of must-run appliances would greatly reduce the flexibility of the aggregate load. In case of economic incentives for the usage of renewables (e.g. lower energy price), a schedule which does not take advantage of the availability of RESes would in turn cause an increase in the energy price, thus affecting the energy bill of all the users (including the cheaters).
Moreover, a wide category of intrusive attacks aimed at Denial of Service (DoS), can be mitigated by imposing a threshold on the maximum number of daily scheduling requests (e.g. a few tens per day), which avoids the generation of fake service requests by dishonest Gateways. Such fake requests would inevitably increase the delay experienced by the Appliances run by honest users.
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Conversely, the effect of malicious Gateways deviating from the standard Crowds message forwarding routine (e.g. dropping messages instead of relaying them, thus preventing the requests generated by honest users from being processed), can be alleviated by lowering the SSS threshold t, which ensures the correct execution of collaborative comparison procedure even in case of up to w − t 325 missing shares.
Obliviousness. Similarly to [28] , we define the architecture as oblivious if a collusion of any number of Gateways cannot obtain information about the power consumption pattern of the scheduled electrical appliances of the same type, except for the ones belonging to the local household. More formally, we de-330 fine the Obliv experiment, which involves a challenger C and a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary D controlling the whole set of Gateways:
1. At a given time slot τ D selects two Appliances a 0 , a 1 ∈ A and communicates to C the appliance types AT a0 , AT a1 , the tags r a0 , r a1 , the Gateway
and the random numbers ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ t−1 to be used to divide each sample of V a0 (i) and V a1 (i) in shares.
2. C selects a random bit b = {0, 1}, generates
) ∀s ∈ S} and communicates it to D.
3. D outputs a bit b .
The architecture provides obliviousness if:
Blindness. Moreover, we say that the architecture is t-blind if a collusion of less than t Schedulers cannot learn anything about the energy consumption trend of the appliances to be scheduled, except their type. To formalize this property, we define the Blind experiment, involving a challenger C and an adversary D controlling a set of SchedulersS : |S| < t: The architecture provides t-blindness if:
Sender Anonymity. Finally, according to the definition in [38] , the architecture provides sender anonymity if a collusion of any number of Schedulers cannot associate a request to the identity of the user whose Appliance generated it.
360
Adopting the same formalization of [35] , we define the following experiment, named S-Anon, which assumes a challenger C and an adversary D controlling the whole set of Schedulers S:
1. D selects an Appliance a ∈ A and communicates V a (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤T to C. The architecture provides sender anonymity if:
Security Analysis
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We now discuss how the security properties defined in Section 5.1 are satisfied by our proposed infrastructure, also providing formal proofs.
Theorem 1.
Under the assumption that the cryptosystem E(K e , ·) ensures message indistinguishability, the privacy-preserving load scheduling infrastructure provides obliviousness for Appliances of the same type. 
Since the random polynomials used to calculate each share belonging to
are independently generated, the knowledge of S exploiting the perfect secrecy property of SSS (which states that the knowledge of less than t shares does not leak any information about the secret), we can write:
The extension to a set ofT measurements is straightforward. Note that for
390
Appliances of the same type, the overall number of samples in a message is the same, thus the message length does not provide any additional information.
Since in this paper we assume t = w, information leakages can occur only in case all the w Schedulers are compromised and the infrastructure is w-blind. Proof. LetG be the random variable indicating the set of Gateways from which the set of Schedulers S receive the w encrypted shares. Since each share is routed independently, then
Using (1) we have,
Therefore, D obtains no additional information about the identifier of the local Gateway g, from which it follows that the S-Anon experiment has no advantage with respect to randomness. 
The objective function (8) minimizes the sum of the delays experienced by the Appliances. Constraint (9) imposes that, in case the amount of energy required by the must-run Appliances does not exceed the energy provided by RESes, the overall energy consumption due to both must-run and deferrable/interruptible In order to adapt the above discussed model to deferrable non-interruptible Appliances, the following constraint has to be included in the formulation to impose that no intermediate service interruptions occur:
Performance Evaluation
In this Section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheduling 440 mechanism in terms of computational complexity, message number and length.
Moreover, we compare the achieved average service delay to the optimal results obtained by means of the ILP formulation presented in Section 6. In our implementation, the hybrid cryptosystem used for the share encryption is the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm [41] , which uses the RSA public key cryp-445 tosystem modulo n, the KDF2 key derivation function (based on SHA-1) and the AES-Wrap-k key-wrapping scheme (where k is the AES key size) to communicate an ephemeral k-bit-long key used to encrypt the samples V (i) by means of the standard AES scheme operating in Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC).
Computational Complexity
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We start discussing the asymptotic number of incoming/outgoing messages for each node and scheduling phase. As shown in Table 2 , the number of mes-sages exchanged by the Gateways exhibits a linear dependence on w, while for the Schedulers it depends linearly onT and superlinearly on w (the logarithmic factor is due to the collaborative comparison procedure discussed in [33] ).
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However, since the total number of shares w is expected to be limited, the time horizonT is the only tunable parameters significantly influencing the number of messages. on the data provided in [42, 43] ). At the Schedulers, the computational time of the share collaborative comparison performed in multiple rounds depending on w is comparable to the running time of the hybrid encryption/decryption.
Note that Table 3 does not report the operations performed by the Crowds
470
forwarding routine: for a detailed a discussion on the impact of |G| and p on the message latency, expected path length and number of appearances of a given
Gateway on all paths, the reader is referred to [35] . 
] bits in case of must-run Appliance (where k +64 bits is the output 
] bits in case of deferrable non-interruptible Appliance, and of Scheduler the selected consumption curve through the message F s of length
Possible choices of the system parameters are: 1024-bit-long modulo n for 495 the RSA cryptosystem, key length k =128 bits for the AES cryptosystem and 64-bit-long modulo q for the SSS scheme. The appliance tag AT a and the random number r a can be assumed to have length of 2 bits and 32 bits respectively.
The assumed scheduling horizon can be a 24 hours period, divided in time slot duration is 5 minutes, which corresponds toT =288 samples. The message 500 lengths obtained with these parameters are summarized in Table 1 
Update consumption curve (deferr./interr) O(1) - Table 3 : Computational load at each node for the scheduling of a single service request
Scheduler must-run:
see Table 4 for the cost details. 
Numerical Assessment
To compare the service delay introduced by our first-fit scheduling approach to the minimum delay obtainable through an optimization procedure, we extracted several load profiles of dishwashers (peak consumption of 1500 W), washing machines (peak consumption of 750 W), and dryers (peak consumption 510 6000 W) from the SMART* dataset [44] and resampled them with a rate of one sample every 5 minutes. As renewable energy supplying profile, we considered a windfarm with peak production of 50 MW: the normalized hourly production (available at [45] ) has been linearly interpolated to obtain a 5 minutes sampling period. We considered a scenario with 20 households equipped with one 515 dishwasher, one washing machine and one dryer each, for a total amount of 60 appliances. Each of them generates a service request with uniform distribution within a period of 24 hours, and 365 instances, corresponding to 1 year of wind energy production data. Each household is also equipped with a set of must-run appliances including lights, oven, fridge, and heater (see [44] for the 520 comprehensive list), with a peak overall consumption of 5000 W.
For each instance, both the scheduling approach proposed in Section 4 and the ILP formulation described in Section 6 have been applied, first under the assumption that the 60 appliances are deferrable non-interruptible, then assuming them as deferrable and interruptible. Since the time horizon of each 525 instance is one day, in case the scheduling delay of an Appliance exceeds 24 hours, the scheduling is considered to be infeasible. Table 5 reports the respective probabilities of finding a feasible solution to the scheduling problem.
For non-interruptible Appliances, in approximately 15.1% of the considered instances, both approaches do not provide a feasible result: this happens when the 530 overall daily energy production is not sufficient to satisfy all the service requests.
Therefore, in those cases, the Appliances must be served using non-renewable energy sources, which are assumed to be unlimited and thus do not introduce any scheduling delay 4 . Such percentage reduces to 13.2% in case of interruptible appliances. In a borderline scenario, where the amount of wind energy is only slightly greater than the total energy demand, it may happen that our proposed scheduling approach fails in providing a feasible schedule, while the ILP formulation succeeds. However, we incurred in such condition only for the 0.8% of the considered instances in case of non-interruptible Appliances and for 1.9% in case of interruptible Appliances. Finally, in around 84% of cases, both approaches 
Conclusions
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving framework for the scheduling of power consumption requests generated by electrical Appliances in a Smart Grid scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to address the 
